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INTRODUCTION 
The nonobviousness requirement plays a critical role in United 
States patent law. The requirement ensures that patents will be 
granted for only significant advances over previously existing technol-
ogy. Nonobviousness reflects "a careful balance between the need to 
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refine-
ment through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the 
very lifeblood of a competitive economy." 1 The patent system's health 
is linked to a properly working nonobviousness doctrine. 
Much of the current discussion regarding nonobviousness 
focuses on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 2 The court's 
jurisprudence in this area, and in particular the court's application of 
a particular part of the nonobviousness doctrine-the "suggestion 
test," is the target of recent scrutiny. The court's case law is the center 
of two recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the other by National Research Council (NRC).3 It is also the 
subject of a currently pending case before the Supreme Court, KSR 
1 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
2 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). 
3 See CoMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RlcHTS IN THE KNoWLEDGE-BASED EcoN., 
NAT'L REsEARcH CouNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (Stephen A. Mer-
rill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE CoMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANcE oF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND Pouc..Y (2003), available at http:/ I 
www.ftc.gov I os/2003/1 0 /innovationrpt.pdf. 
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International Co. v. Telejlex, Inc.4 The general conclusion of the two 
reports and the briefing in support of certiorari in KSR is that the 
Federal Circuit has improperly relaxed the nonobviousness require-
ment. The court has made it easier to find a claimed invention 
nonobvious and, as a result, obtain and enforce an invalid patent. 
One of the alleged causes of this reduction in the nonobviousness 
standard is the suggestion test employed by the court. 
The problem with the recent reports and the current argumenta-
tion before the Supreme Court in KSR is that none of the assertions 
being made are supported by recent empirical data.5 The reports and 
criticism are only based on the "feel" of the case law" or the facts of 
the KSR case alone? There is a real need for an empirical study that 
systemically looks at the broader question of whether the Federal 
Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement and the narrow 
question of whether the suggestion test is the cause. Such a study 
would provide valuable data to test the current assertions about the 
Federal Circuit's case law and inform decisionmakers, such as the 
Supreme Court, who are presently considering modifYing the nonob-
viousness doctrine. 
4 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
5 The NRC's report explicitly notes that no empirical analysis of these claims has 
been done. See NAT'L REsFARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3 ("The claim that quality 
has deteriorated in a broad and systematic way could be, but has not been, empirically 
tested."). 
There are studies, none yet published, that focus on this recent criticism and 
come to an opposite conclusion. See generally Supplemental Brief for the Respondents 
at 4-6, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. June 6, 2006), 2006 WL 
1547496 (collecting recent cases where the Federal Circuit has found patents obvious 
and used a broad suggestion test and, not surprisingly, coming to the opposite conclu-
sion of most critics); Christopher A. Co tropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an t.videntiary 
Lens: The "Suggestion 'Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REv. (forthcoming) (focus-
ing on the specific claim that the Federal Circuit employs a strictly narrow suggestion 
test and concluding that the Federal Circuit employs an evidentiary rule to determine 
the breadth of evidence allowed to prove a suggestion to combine); Lee Petherbridge 
& R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law 
of Obviousness, 85 TEx. L. REv. (forthcoming june 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=923309 (examining empirically the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness juris-
prudence and finding that the court has not weakened the standards for obtaining 
patents). Notably, these studies either collect different data than the study reported 
in this Article or take different looks at the same type of data. 
6 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 12. 
7 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
12-15, KSR, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2453601 (noting that the 
KSR case demonstrates the rigid application of the suggestion test and how it results 
in an improper finding that the patent is obvious). 
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This Article provides such an empirical study. The study exam-
ines all Federal Circuit cases over a four-year period considering the 
nonobviousness of a patent claim. Appeals from both patent infringe-
ment cases before district courts and pending patent applications and 
interferences before the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) are investigated. The study looks at the data in two levels of 
detail. 
First, the study takes a "macro-level" look at the collected data, 
focusing on only the outcome of each of the nonobviousness claims. 
Whether the Federal Circuit found the patent claim nonobvious or 
obvious is recorded. In addition, whether the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, reversed, or vacated the lower tribunal's decision is consid-
ered. The purpose of this macro-level study is to test the broad claim 
being made in recent criticism-that the Federal Circuit has lowered 
the nonobviousness requirement. 
Second, the study takes a "micro-level" look at the actual reason-
ing behind the court's findings on the nonobviousness issue. This 
part of the study examines what prompted a finding of nonobvious, 
seeing if it was a failure to meet the suggestion test or something else. 
The micro-level study also focuses on the procedural posture of the 
case below-whether it was a grant of summary judgment, a grant of a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), a verdict from a 
bench trial, or a verdict from a jury trial. The micro-level study 
attempts to measure the impact of the suggestion test on the nonobvi-
ousness analysis. 
Based on this study's findings, the Article concludes that recent 
criticism is not supported by the last four years of Federal Circuit case 
law. In appeals from patent infringement cases, the macro-level study 
finds a distribution that slightly favors findings of nonobvious, with 
36.27% of the patents being found nonobvious and 28.43% of the 
patents being found obvious.8 In appeals from the USPTO, the 
macro-level study finds a high percentage of findings of obvious in 
85.19% of the patents. These results suggest that the court has not 
lowered the nonobviousness requirement and may be maintaining a 
higher nonobviousness requirement in the case of the USPTO. But 
this conclusion is greatly tempered by the fact that the cases studied 
may all include litigants and patent applicants that have already taken 
into account a lowered nonobviousness standard. Thus, any inference 
into the strength of the nonobviousness requirement from this data is 
weak at best. The results of the macro-level study, therefore, while 
8 The remaining percentage of patents, 35.29%, were vacated by the court. See 
infra Part lll.A.l. 
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providing some insight, cannot provide a solid conclusion one way or 
the other. 
The micro-level study produced more usable results. The sugges-
tion test causes a finding of nonobvious, or a vacation of a finding of 
obvious, in 32.91% of the patents appealed from patent infringement 
cases. The suggestion test causes similar findings in appeals from the 
USPTO in 11.11% of patents appealed. These low percentages stand 
in sharp contrast to claims that the suggestion test has caused the non-
obviousness requirement to lower, particularly in the context of the 
USPTO. Instead, the suggestion test plays a fairly small role in the 
court's nonobviousness jurisprudence. 
This Article comes to these conclusions in the following manner. 
First, in Part I, the Article provides a background on the nonobvious-
ness requirement, the suggestion test, and recent criticism. Part II of 
the Article describes the empirical study, including the parameters 
used and the study's limitations. Part III of the Article reports the 
study's findings, starting first with the macro-level study's results and 
then micro-level study's results. The Article then provides a detailed 
conclusion, reiterating the more significant findings from the study. 
l. BACKGROUND 
A. Basics of the Nonobviousness Requirement 
The nonobviousness9 requirement in patent law has been termed 
"the ultimate condition for patentability."10 An invention must be 
more than just new and useful, it must also be of"a significant enough 
technical advance to merit the award of a patent."11 The non obvious-
ness requirement also "ask[s] whether an invention likely would 
emerge in roughly the same time frame-that is, without significant 
delay-'but for' the prospect of the patent." 12 The requirement 
ensures that a patent is granted for only those inventions that would 
have not been created but for the incentive of patent protection. 
9 The term "nonobviousness" is used to define the inquiry to determine whether 
an invention is nonobvious or obvious. For the purposes of this Article, the term 
nonobviousness does not indicate the ultimate conclusion that a claimed invention is 
nonobvious, and thus eligible for patent protection. 
10 See NoNOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTIMATE CoNDITION oF PATENTABILI"IY Qohn F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
11 RoBERT PATRICK MERGEs & joHN FITZGERALD DuFFY, PATENT LAw AND PoucY 
644 (3d ed. 2002). 
12 FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 6; see also id., ch. 4, at 7-8 (asserting 
that this "but for" test instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper 
balance between patent protection and competition). 
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The requirement ensures that patent protection is not given to 
inventions that have no social benefit because they are of minimal 
advance over what has already been done and "others would have 
developed the idea even without the incentive of a patent." 13 Provid-
ing protection for obvious ideas is socially harmful because it can lead 
to "a proliferation of economically insignificant patents that are 
expensive to search and to license." 14 Protection for obvious advances 
skews the patent system's incentive structure-focusing would-be 
inventors on minor developments as opposed to significant technolog-
ical advances. These obvious patents provide little benefit to society 
due to their coverage of insignificant subject matter and clog the 
inventive pathways to highly beneficial technological advances. 
Nonobviousness, therefore, is an important requirement for 
protection in the United States' patent system. 15 The doctrine plays a 
central role in deciding which inventions are patentable, and thus get 
a limited period of exclusivity, and those that do not. While initially a 
common law requirement, the test for nonobviousness was codified by 
the 1952 Patent Act. 16 The statutory test for nonobviousness indicates 
that: 
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains.17 
The Supreme Court, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 18 addressed 35 
U.S.C. § 103 and explained the process for determining nonobvious-
ness.19 The Court noted that § 103 "lends itself to several basic factual 
inquiries."20 There factual inquiry included: (1) identifying the "scope 
and content of the prior art''; (2) determining the "differences 
between the prior art and the claims"; and (3) ascertaining "the level 
13 MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 11, at 646; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent 
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv. 
1, 50-51 (2004) ("[A)n optimal uniform scheme of protection will provide protection 
that will leave some desirable innovative products unprofitable."). 
14 MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 11, at 647. 
15 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., .t'-Obviousness, 7 MrcH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 
363, 370 (2001). 
16 35 u.s.c. § 103 (2000). 
17 Jd.§103(a). 
18 383 u.s. 1 (1966). 
19 Jd.at12-l7. 
20 ld. at 17. 
2007] NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art."21 The Court then indicated that 
"[a] gainst this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the 
subject matter is determined."22 Secondary considerations are then 
considered. 23 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,24 and 
its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, devel-
oped a structured approach to making the final determination of non-
obvious or obvious-the "suggestion test. "25 Once the three initial 
inquiries articulated in Graham are made, Federal Circuit case law 
requires a showing that there is some "reason, suggestion, or motiva-
tion" that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to com-
bine the relevant art teachings to make the patented invention.26 The 
Federal Circuit has made the suggestion test a required component of 
any nonobviousness analysis in a patent infringement litigation and 
part of the prima facie case of obvious during patent examination 
before the USPT0.27 The suggestion test provides an analytical tool 
to determine when the jump can properly be made from defining the 
relevant prior art, the skill in the art, and differences between the art 
and the invention to a conclusion of obvious. 28 A finding of obvi-
21 !d. 
22 !d. This quote from the Supreme Court demonstrates how the term "nonobvi-
ousness" can also be used to define the ultimate conclusion in a nonobviousness anal-
ysis. For the sake of clarity, this Article will attempt to use the term "nonobviousness" 
to only define the inquiry itself, not the result. 
23 !d. at 17-18. 
24 The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002) (removing cases with only patent law counterclaims 
out of the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction). 
25 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[1)[e] (2005); see also In re 
Fridolph, 134 F.2d 414, 416 (C.C.P.A. 1943) ("In considering more than one refer-
ence ... the question always is: does such art suggest doing the thing which the 
[inventor] has done?"). 
26 Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
27 Id.; In reThrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
28 One of the main goals of the suggestion test also is to combat against hindsight 
bias. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1 999) (" [T] he best defense 
against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is 
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation 
to combine prior art references."). Hindsight bias is a significant problem in the 
nonobviousness analysis. See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demon-
stration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHio ST. LJ. 1391, 
1403-06 (2006) [hereinafter Mandel, Empirical Demonstration] (finding empirical data 
to support the existence of hindsight bias). Professor Mandel's most recent experi-
mentation with mock jurors found that hindsight bias is so strong that even the sug-
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ousness cannot be made unless there is some impetus-that is a sug-
gestion, teaching, or motivation-to make the leap from what is 
found in the individual pieces of prior art to the invention for which 
patent protection is sought. 
B. Recent Criticism of the Federal Circuit's Nonobviousness jurisprudence 
Much of the current discussion regarding nonobviousness 
focuses on the Federal Circuit. The court's jurisprudence in this area, 
and in particular the court's application of the suggestion test, is the 
target of this recent scrutiny. The court's case law is the center of two 
recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission and the other 
by the National Research Council.29 It is also the subject of a 
currently pending case before the Supreme Court, KSR International 
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 30 The general conclusion of the two reports and 
the briefing in support of certiorari in KSR is that the Federal Circuit 
has improperly relaxed the nonobviousness requirement. 31 The court 
has made it easier to find a claimed invention nonobvious and, as a 
result, obtain and enforce a patent. One of the alleged causes of this 
reduction in the nonobviousness standard is the suggestion test 
employed by the court. 
The FTC's 2003 report notes a "perceived . trend since the 
advent of the Federal Circuit toward reducing the size of the step 
required for patentability-that is, reducing the rigor of the nonobvi-
ousness standard."32 As a result, the report concludes that more obvi-
ous patents are being issued by the USPTO and held valid by the 
court.33 The NRC's 2004 report comes to a similar, yet qualified, 
conclusion.34 "[T]here might have been some dilution of the applica-
tion of the non-obviousness standard in biotechnology and some limi-
tations on its proper application to business methods patent 
applications," and, as a result, patent quality is suffering.35 The peti-
gestion test may be unable to fully mitigate its effects in all cases. See Gregory Mandel, 
Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court 
in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALEj. OF L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2007) [hereinafter Mandel, Experi-
mental Study]. 
29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
30 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR lnt'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, 10-11, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 
No. 04-1350 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2005). 
32 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 9. 
33 Jd. at 8-9. 
34 See NAT't. REsEARCH CouNCIL, supra note 3, at 3. 
35 /d. 
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tion for certiorari in KSR, and the amici that supported the petition, 
all come to a similar conclusion-the Federal Circuit relaxed the non-
obviousness requirement.36 The United States, which filed a brief in 
support of certiorari, specifically asserts that the Federal Circuit's non-
obviousness jurisprudence establishes "an inflexible requirement for 
determining obviousness" that causes patent protection to extend to 
"non-innovative combinations of familiar elements. "37 
These reports and briefs all argue, at least in part, that the 
Federal Circuit's suggestion test causes this relaxation of the nonobvi-
ousness requirement.38 Because a suggestion must be found to hold a 
claimed invention obvious, the suggestion test works as a "one-way 
ratchet."39 It only acts as an obstacle to an obvious finding and, thus, 
increases the likelihood of an erroneous nonobvious finding. The 
Federal Circuit has also limited the suggestion test to suggestions in 
the prior art, ignoring other, undocumented sources such as ordinary 
skill.40 This increases the difficulty in finding a patent obvious, 
further lowering the nonobviousness standard.41 Limiting the scope 
of viable suggestions makes it extremely difficult to find claims invalid 
that involve technologies, such as business methods, where there is 
little memorialized and publicly available knowledge.42 Additionally, 
36 See Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems Inc., General Motors Corp., Hallmark 
Cards, Inc., Fortune Brands, Inc., and Electrolux North America in Support of Rever-
sal at 1, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 
2452365 (noting that the Federal Circuit established "too lax a standard for patenta-
bilityn); Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 9-10, No. 04-1350, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 
22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452369; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Progress & Freedom Foun-
dation in Support of the Petitioner at 8-12, KSR, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 
2006 WL 2452361 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's case law is biased toward finding 
a claimed invention nonobvious); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 
24-27 (citing both the ITC and NRC reports for support). 
37 Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, KSR, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 
2006), 2006 WL 1455398. 
38 See id. (indicating that the Federal Circuit "has transformed" the suggestion 
test into "an inflexible requirementn that "extends patent protection to non-innova-
tive combinations of familiar elements"). 
39 FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 14 (citing the testimony of former 
USPTO director Q. Todd Dickinson that the suggestion test operates as a "one-way 
ratchet: it can help confirm obviousness, but it does not necessarily identity 
nonobviousness"). 
40 See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, supra note 36, at 7-9. 
41 /d. 
42 See NAT'L REsEARcH CouNCIL, supra note 3, at 88-89 (noting that "[i]n an area 
like business methods" the "published literature does not fully describe the state of 
the art"). The NRC's report further notes that even when business method informa-
920 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 82:3 
obvious information is rarely documented because of its widely known 
and uninteresting nature. Furthermore, the critics assert that by limit-
ing the scope of possible suggestions to the prior art, the USPTO's 
ability to properly assess nonobviousness is especially hampered.43 
The USPTO cannot rely upon its own scientific expertise and knowl-
edge and must instead expend limited resources searching for sugges-
tions in prior art. 44 This causes the USPTO to allow patent 
applications that are, in truth, directed toward obvious inventions. 
Finally, the factual nature of the suggestion test impinges on the abil-
ity of litigants to successfully dismiss invalid patents on summary judg-
ment.45 This results in more unnecessary costs on patent players, the 
judicial system, and society as a whole.46 
C. Need for an Empirical Study of Recent Federal Circuit 
Nonobviousness Case Law 
Unfortunately, the FTC and NRC reports and the briefs in 
support of the petition for certiorari in KSRfail to perform any empir-
ical analysis to see if their conclusions are true-that the Federal Cir-
cuit had lowered the nonobviousness requirement and that the 
suggestion test is the cause.47 The reports and criticism cited above 
are based on the "feel" of the case law48 or the facts of the KSR case 
alone.49 An empirical study that systemically looks at both the 
tion is published, it is mostly likely that "non-obvious information" is published. Id. at 
90. 
43 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 17-18; see also 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of 
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 885, 888 (2004) ("The resulting analysis excludes 
from consideration the judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledge of ordinary practi-
tioners in the field that cannot be documented in the written record."); Arti K Rai, 
Allocating Power over ~Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 907, 
912-17 (2004) (describing the "key problem" of the "Federal Circuit's failure to 
recognize that the USPTO can, and should, be allowed to insert its knowledge of the 
art into the patent examination process."). 
44 See NAT'L REsEARCH CouNCIL, supra note 3, at 88-89 (concluding that the 
USPTO is "severely handicapped"). 
45 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 17 (stating 
that " [ t) he Federal Circuit's test nevertheless prevents summary resolution of 
(nonobviousness] "). 
46 See id. 
47 The NRC's report admits that no empirical analysis has been done. NAT'L 
REsEARcH CouNciL, supra note 3, at 3. 
48 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 12. 
49 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 12-15 (noting 
that the KSR case demonstrates the rigid application of the suggestion test and how it 
results in an improper finding that the patent is obvious). 
2007] NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 921 
broader question of whether the Federal Circuit has lowered the non-
obviousness requirement and the narrow question of whether the sug-
gestion test is the cause needs to be done. 
Information produced from such an empirical study is particu-
larly useful given the current discussions and the pending KSR case 
before the Supreme Court. A good part of the calls for reform rest on 
the assumptions that the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonobvious-
ness bar and that the suggestion test is to blame. If these assumptions 
are baseless, reforms produceCi from them will be misdirected and 
inefficient and, as a result, unlikely to improve patent quality. Such 
reforms may have negative effects. Changes in the area of nonobvi-
ousness, an already difficult doctrine to grasp and apply,50 will only 
muddy the doctrine, making nonobviousness determinations uncer-
tain and unclear. In addition, focusing on the Federal Circuit's 
nonobviousness jurisprudence and, specifically, the suggestion test 
may simply waste resources and energy that are better directed to 
other aspects of nonobviousness or other areas of patent law reform. 
Making sure the problem with the current state of nonobviousness is 
properly understood is the first step in nonobviousness reform. 
Understanding the Federal Circuit's recent case law in the area takes 
this first step. 
This call for an empirical assessment is not to say that empirical 
studies have never been done on nonobviousness. Professor Glynn 
Lunney studied the Federal Circuit's nonobviousnessjurisprudence in 
a 2001 article.51 Professor Lunney's study examined the percentage 
of patents found invalid by the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor 
court and regional circuits, due to a finding of obviousness in eight 
different years spread over a fifty-year period.52 He found a drop in 
the percentage of patents found obvious and attributed this drop to 
the introduction of the Federal Circuit and the doctrinal changes to 
nonobviousness the court introduced.53 The study provides a great 
50 See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 9 (1966) (ujefferson saw clearly the 
difficulty in 'drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."' (quoting Letter 
from Thomas jefferson to Issac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
jEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, I857)));Joseph P. Meara, Note, 
Just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the An? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 
77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 272 (2002). 
51 Lunney, supra note 15, at 370-75. 
52 See id. (using previous studies to obtain data for the six pre-Federal Circuit data 
points and collecting data for the final two Federal Circuit data points). 
53 See id. at 372-80 (citing both the suggestion test and elevation of secondary 
considerations as the doctrinal changes responsible for the reduction in obvious 
findings). 
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point of comparison to what is happening currently, but its last data 
point is in 1994-1995.54 Furthermore, the study looks no further than 
the Federal Circuit's final holding on nonobviousness.55 For example, 
there is no investigation as to what the lower court's disposition was or 
how the suggestion test was used by the Federal Circuit in the case. 
The study provides some, but not much, assistance in evaluating the 
recent claims by the FTC, NRC, and the petitioner and amici in KSR, 
particularly with respect to the effects of the suggestion test. Profes-
sors John Alison and Mark Lemley also empirically looked at nonobvi-
ousness case law, but included district court opinions in the study. 56 
Furthermore, the study does not focus on the suggestion test's role in 
nonobviousness cases. While this study, like Professor Lunney's, adds 
tremendous value to the nonobviousness discussion, it does not 
directly address the current debate. 
Recent empirical studies also add to the current discussion. 
These all have some bearing on recent criticism of the Federal 
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. But none fully address all 
the issues presented in KSR and the ITC and NRC reports. Professor 
Greg Mandel wrote two articles reporting on his experimentation 
using mockjurors to determine the effects of hindsight on the nonob-
viousness analysis. 57 The first article looked at the hindsight question 
in general, finding a significant hindsight effect in nonobviousness 
determinations.58 Professor Mandel's second study focused on the 
ability of the suggestion test to ameliorate the hindsight bias. 59 While 
Professor Mandel's studies focused on the hindsight bias, he obsenred 
that the suggestion test cannot be the cause of erroneous findings of 
nonobvious because mock jurors found inventions nonobvious with 
and without the suggestion test.60 Sean McEldowney recently pub-
54 ld. at 371, 373. 
55 I d. at 370-71 (describing the study). 
56 John R. Allison & Mark A Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA QJ. 185, 194-97 (1998). 
57 Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1406-09; Mandel, Experimen-
tal Study, supra note 28, at ll-20. 
58 Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1409-10. 
59 See Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at 15-20. He found that hind-
sight bias is so strong that even the suggestion test may be unable to fully mitigate its 
effects in all cases. ld. at 16. He noted that the suggestion test may do more to 
reduce the effects of hindsight bias in complex technology cases. ld. at 33. Recent 
theoretical and empirical work supports this claim. See Cotropia, supra note 5 (manu-
script at 64); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the "Death» ofOlroiousness: An Empir-
ical Study of District Court Olroiousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TEcH. L. REv. 4, 'II 41, http:/ 
I stir. stanford.edu/STLR/ Articles/06 _STLR_ 4/McEldowney-Obviousness. pdf. 
60 Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at 31-32. 
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lished a study focusing on nonobviousness at the district court level.61 
McEldowney's findings show a decrease in the 1990s of both district 
courts reaching the issue of nonobviousness and finding patents obvi-
ous.62 He found that, while this would appear to suggest that the non-
obviousness requirement has lowered, there may be other forces at 
play.63 
Finally, a yet unpublished study by Professors Lee Petherbridge 
and Polk Wagner comes the closest to fully addressing the questions 
presented by recent criticism. 64 Professors Petherbridge and 
Wagner's study takes a look at Federal Circuit nonobviousness cases 
over a fifteen-year period, from 1990 through 2005.65 While the study 
takes a look at the claims of a lowering nonobviousness standard and 
the suggestion test's role, the main thrust of the study is to determine 
the stability and predictability of the court's nonobviousness doc-
trine.66 In reaching the conclusion that the doctrine is very stable, the 
study also finds little evidence of a lowered standard or the suggestion 
test acting as an obstacle to findings of obvious.67 
This very recent push to empirically study nonobviousness is 
refreshing. There are still holes that need to be filled. A study is 
needed that considers all of the recent Federal Circuit opinions that 
span the period of the FTC and NRC reports and takes a complete 
look at the impact of the suggestion test. This Article does just that. 
Furthermore, when looking at the validity of empirical results, there is 
benefit to overlapping studies. The results from an empirical study 
becomes stronger if they are validated by another's results. In addi-
tion, the more ways nonobviousness is examined, the richer one's 
understanding of the doctrine becomes. 
61 McEldowney, supra note 59, 1 3. 
62 Id.1 63. 
63 ld. 1 64-67 (noting that "the Federal Circuit's doctrinal shifts in obviousness 
seem more subtle and less damning than some have asserted" and that the regional 
variation amongst results contradicts the assertion that "the Federal Circuit has effec-
tively objectified obviousness"). 
64 See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20). 
65 ld. (manuscript at 24-27). Notably, in contrast to the study reported in this 
Article, Professors Petherbridge and Wagner's study does not collect data from Rule 
36 cases and tallies results based on "analysis" as opposed to patents. I d. (manuscript 
at 29-30, 44 tbl.5). 
66 Id. (manuscript at 28-43) (noting that the "overall goal of this study is to con-
tribute to a burgeoning body of literature that addresses the effectiveness of the Fed-
eral Circuit at meeting the goals mandated by Congress at the time of its creation"). 
67 Id. (manuscript at 51-53). 
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II. . DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
In order to fill the need for more information on the current 
state of nonobviousness, a study of the Federal Circuit's recent nonob-
viousness jurisprudence is performed. The basic goal is to capture 
and code all Federal Circuit decisions on nonobviousness over a 
defined period. This population creates a data set that hopefully 
provides a better insight into whether the Federal Circuit has lowered 
the nonobviousness requirement and what role the suggestion test 
plays in the doctrine. 
A. Parameters of the Study 
This study contains a defined population of written, final deci-
sions of the Federal Circuit issued over a four-year period, from Janu-
ary l, 2002 through December 31, 2005. 68 Only validity decisions are 
included in the study, not decisions on unenforceability, such as ineq-
uitable conduct, prosecution laches, or patent misuse.69 The popula-
tion of this study initially includes only final decisions on validity, not 
vacations or remands-all decisions where the issue of a patent's valid-
ity is still unsetded. The population is then expanded to include 
those non-final decisions that reach any substantive conclusion on the 
issue of non obviousness. 70 Thus, opinions where a holding of nonob-
viousness is vacated are included in the study. The population 1s 
68 The study's results on are file with the author and are available at 
http:/ /www.cotropia.com/nonobviousnessstudy.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007). 
The cases were obtained by searching LexisNexis's Federal Circuit database over 
this four-year period fo:;>r cases that included the terms "patent" and "infring!" to 
gather appeals from patent infringement cases and the term "patent" in the "In re" 
cases to gather appeals from the USPTO's determinations regarding applications, 
reissues, and reexaminations. An additional search was made to capture appeals from 
decisions by the USPTO in interferences-disputes as to inventorship of a claimed 
invention. See Thomas P. Noud et al., Patent Law Issues Affected by the Predictability of 
Technology in the Field of Invention, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 603, 612 (2006) 
("A patent interference is an administrative proceeding that results in an award of 
priority to one of the parties" who is claiming to be the first to invent.). 
69 For example, fifteen patents held unenforceable due to prosecution laches in 
Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical t.'ducation & Research Foundation, 422 F.3d 
1378, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir. 2005), were not included in this study. 
70 Specifically excluded from this expanded population are cases where the issue 
of nonobviousness arose in the setting of preliminary injunctions. Such cases were 
avoided due to the unique standard under which substantive issues are judged when 
reviewing preliminary injunctions. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that because of the differing level 
of review, "[v]alidity challenges during preliminary injunction proceedings can be 
successful, that is, they may raise substantial questions of invalidity, on evidence that 
would not suffice to support a judgment of invalidity at trial"). 
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expanded to include these additional opinions so as to capture all of 
the Federal Circuit's deliberations on the issue of nonobviousness 
over the four-year period. 
The study includes both published and unpublished written opin-
ions. Summary affirmances, "Rule 36" cases,71 are also included in the 
population to the extent information regarding the issues decided by 
the court can be discerned from appellate briefs and the published 
decisions below.72 Only those decisions involving utility patents, as 
opposed to design or plant patents, are included. In addition, results 
will be separated based on whether it is an appeal from a patent 
infringement decision by a United States district court or an affirmed 
final rejection or interlerence decision of the USPT0.73 
The study is defined in terms of patents, not cases. 74 Often opin-
ions included decisions on the nonobviousness of more than one 
patent, and thus one opinion may result in more than one data point. 
In addition, in those cases where decisions varied with regard to an 
individual patent's claims-that is, some claims were found nonobvi-
ous while others found obvious-each set of validated or invalidated 
claims are counted as a single patent. Therefore, for some cases, a 
decision regarding one patent may be defined as two patents for the 
purpose of the study. 
71 Federal Circuit Rule 36 allows judgment of affirmance without opinion when 
certain conditions exist and an opinion would have no precedential value. See Beth 
Zeitlin Shaw, Note, Please Ignore This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions 
in the Federal Circuit, 12 Gw. MAsoN L. REv. 1013, 1015 (2004) (noting that Rule 36 
allows the court to affirm without opinion when ~the court determines an opinion 
would have no precedential value, and any of five other conditions exist"). 
72 Whether validity, and more particularly nonobviousness, was at issue in the 
Rule 36 cases is discernable from the briefing to the court. The only information 
lacking for such cases is the specific reasoning for the Federal Circuit affirming the 
lower court's ruling on validity. 
The inclusion of Rule 36 cases considering nonobviousness, of which there were 
twenty-four, is a significant difference between this study and the one performed by 
Professors Petherbridge and Wagner. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 
(manuscript at 29-30) (noting that their results would change with the addition of 
Rule 36 opinions to their data set). 
73 Decisions from United States International Trade Commission are included 
with the appeals from United States District Courts. There was, however, only one 
such decision involving the issue of nonobviousness. See Honeywell lnt'l, Inc. v. Int'l 
Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338-42 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In addition, USPTO 
appeals included in the study were those from normal prosecution, reissues, and reex-
aminations. Appeals from interferences were also included to the extent that the 
validity of the count was at issue. 
74 This is another difference between this study and that performed by Professors 
Petherbridge and Wagner. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 
25) (indicating that "their measurement metric is analyses"). 
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B. Data Collected 
For each patent in the population, the following data was 
collected from all of the Federal Circuit's opinions: 
(l) case name, citation, and date of issuance; 
(2) whether the patent was held nonobvious or obvious; 
(3) whether the judgment below was from the grant of summary 
judgment, the grant of a judgment as a matter oflaw QMOL), a bench 
trial, or a jury trial; 
( 4) whether the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated the 
lower tribunal's determination regarding nonobviousness; 
(5) the reason the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated 
the lower tribunal's nonobviousness determination.75 
C. Methodology 
This is a population study, like those previously conducted by 
Professors Allison and Lemley76 and Christian Chu. 77 The study 
generates descriptive statistics to better understand the court's nonob-
viousness jurisprudence over the last four years. Statistical testing on 
these descriptive statistics is also performed. This analysis provides 
further information about the population and the significance of any 
variations in nonobviousness decisions over the past four years. 
This population can be treated as a subset of a "superpopula-
tion," as has been done in previous patent law studies by Professors 
Allison, Lemley and Chu.78 That is, the population of this study can 
be used to predict the "population of an past and future . . . deci-
sions."79 The study can make predictions on the court's nonobvious-
ness jurisprudence of the past and the future. By both focusing on 
the descriptive statistics the study produced and the inferences from 
statistical testing on the population studied, a better understanding of 
the court's nonobviousness jurisprudence will hopefully emerge. 
75 Because of their summary nature, this information was not available for Rule 
36 cases. In those cases, the reason was coded as unknown. 
76 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 201-02. 
77 Christian A Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. Lj. 1075, 1094-95 (2001). 
78 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 201-02; Chu, supra note 77, at 1094. 
79 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 194 n.20. 
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D. Limitations 
As with most empirical studies, this study suffers from a number 
of limitations. The limitations are divided into two categories-popu-
lation biases and inherent limitations.80 
1. Population Biases 
A major complaint one may lodge against this study is that the 
population selected is too narrow. First, a more complete picture of 
the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence would emerge if 
all of the court's jurisprudence was included, and thus all nonobvious-
ness cases should be included back to and beyond the court's creation 
in 1982.81 It is true, more years would have provided a fuller picture. 
But, the four-year period selected contains a good number of patents 
subject to nonobviousness findings-102 patents from district court 
cases and 72 from the USPTO. Furthermore, while information from 
the 1980s and 1990s is nice, the focus of the current debate is on the 
Federal Circuit's recent jurisprudence. It matters little what the 
court's take on nonobviousness was twenty years ago. The important 
question is what is the Federal Circuit's attitude toward nonobvious-
ness now, and this study defines its population in a way to best capture 
and test the current jurisprudence. 
Another potential problem with the study is that the population 
should be expanded to include district court cases, decisions by the 
USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences {the Board), and 
even reasons allowances by individual USPTO examiners. Looking at 
all of these determinations of nonobviousness would provide the 
complete picture of the current state of the doctrine.82 In addition, 
those cases heard by the Federal Circuit, particularly from the 
USPTO, are a small fraction of the nonobviousness determinations 
made in the United States on patent applications. Such appeals are 
80 Such a division is the same as that identified by Professors Allison and Lemley 
in their validity study. See id. at 202-05. 
81 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner attempt to overcome this limitation in 
their study, including cases from 1990 to 2005. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 
(manuscript at 22). However, their study does not expand over the full period of the 
Federal Circuit's existence and include the case law before the court's creation, 
hampering its ability to obtain a "complete" picture of nonobviousness. !d. Other 
empirical studies have attempted to do just that, but either do not include recent data 
or focus only on district court cases. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 15, at 370-75 (focus-
ing on eight time periods with 1994-1995 being the most recent); McEldowney, supra 
note 59, at 1[1[ 22-28 (focusing on district court opinions). 
82 A recent study by McEldowney, mentioned earlier, examines district court 
cases. See McEldowney, supra note 59, at ~1 22-28. 
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also self-selecting, influenced by decisions by litigators and patent 
examiners, all of which arguably pollute the integrity of the data col-
lected from these cases. 
These are all valid points, and a more complete study, particularly 
one that focuses on nonobviousness decisions made inside the 
USPTO, would provide an especially valuable insight into how the 
doctrine is really used in the patent system. But this study focuses on 
what recent reports, the KSR case, and most patent players focus on-
recent decisions by the Federal Circuit. Reported and published deci-
sions, particularly those by an appellate court, both directly and indi-
rectly shape both one's understanding and expectations of the law.83 
The nature of the common law and stare decisis requires lower tribu-
nals to pay attention to and follow the precedent of appellate courts.84 
Furthermore, published decisions by an appellate court are some of 
the only views would-be litigants have as to how their disputes may be 
decided, and thus inform their actions under the law.85 This is all 
particularly true in the case of patent law and the Federal Circuit, 
where the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all patent 
appeals86 and has been referred to, on more than one occasion, as the 
"Supreme Court of patent law."87 Put simply, this study focuses on the 
Federal Circuit for the same reason recent criticism, the Supreme 
Court in KSR, and patent players are focused on the Federal Circuit-
the court's opinions set the tone for patent law in the United States. 
83 Michael Heise, The Importance of Being E-mpirical, 26 PEPr. L. REv. 807, 826 
(1999) ("An important function of written published judicial opinions is to shape 
future litigants' expectations and predictions about what might happen if their case 
should proceed to trial. Moreover, these expectations and predictions in tum influ-
ence the nuanced decisional analyses about whether to even initiate, let alone litigate, 
potential legal claims."). 
84 See Pin tip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Ovmule: Speech Act Theary and the 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE LJ. 493, 498 (2003) (noting that "in the common 
law ... the only texts that judges can reference are the texts of earlier judicial 
opinions~). 
85 See Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How judges Allocate Their Time, 6 
AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 1, 2 (2004) (concluding that "the small percentage of judges' 
decisions that are published are responsible for changes in law and for most observ-
ers' perceptions of the federal court system"); id. at 7 ( [P] ublished decisions are more 
likely to be read and cited by the legal community."). 
86 28 U.S.C. § l295(a) (2000). The court's exclusivity in the area has been 
eroded. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" jurisdiction and Uniformity in 
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TEL.ECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 253 (2003) (discussing the effect of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Varnado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
535 U.S. 826 (2002)). 
87 Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning 
Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 2 (1999). 
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2. Inherent Limitations 
There are other limitations to this study that are not directly 
attributable to the population selected. The first limitation is the 
study's inability to determine the "correct" result in each of the non-
obviousness decisions collected. A complete study that wanted to see 
if the Federal Circuit truly lowered the nonobviousness requirement 
would collect nonobviousness decisions and compare their results to 
the correct result under a proper standard for a given set of facts. A 
lowered requirement would result in a significantly lower number of 
findings of obviousness in reported decisions as compared to the cor-
rect decision for those cases. 
Put frankly, such an inquiry on a large scale does not appear pos-
sible. Nonobviousness is a very fact-intensive inquiry that depends on 
the technologies involved and the skill level of those of ordinary skill 
in the art.88 The doctrine's "intensely fact-dependent nature ... 
makes it difficult to determine whether a decision ... is incorrect."89 
This is not to say that it is impossible to arrive at a correct nonobvious-
ness decision. It just means that in order to empirically test the cor-
rectness of each Federal Circuit decision, one would need an 
incredible level of expertise in various technologies and a tremendous 
amount of time. 
Another limitation to this study pertains to its predictive power, 
or lack thereof. As noted by Professors Allison and Lemley in their 
validity study, "even the best predictive efforts in this area encounter 
fundamental limitations imposed by the fact that law and the litigation 
process change over time."90 This study can describe, and attempt to 
predict, what happened over the four years of collected data. The 
information it provides outside that four-year period, particularly 
going forward, should be taken with caution. Things can, and do, 
change. However, this study is making the same predictions recent 
reports and arguments before the Supreme Court in KSR are mak-
ing-indicating what the Federal Circuit has done and that this will be 
what it continues to do in the future.91 
In the end, this study's main goal is to provide a clearer picture of 
the recent case law that was. The Article will make inferences as to 
88 St:~ In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
89 Meara, supra note 50, at 280; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 
(1966) (noting that "[w]hat is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to 
be uniformity of thought in every given factual contexn. 
90 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 205. 
91 See supra Part I.B. 
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what this case law means for what will be. But, these inferences will, in 
the end, be simply that-inferences. 
III. REsuLTS OF THE STUDY 
Using the population and data set defined in Part II, this Article 
tests the current assertion that the Federal Circuit reduced the nonob-
viousness requirement and that the suggestion test is the cause of this 
reduction. This assertion is tested in two ways. First, a macro-level 
view of the Federal Circuit's recent nonobviousness jurisprudence is 
taken. All of the opinions over the study's four-year period that 
include any determination on the issue of nonobviousness are 
examined. The macro-level study takes note of the Federal Circuit's 
final decision for each patent-findings of either nonobvious or obvi-
ous-and whether the decision affirms, reverses, or vacates the lower 
tribunal's decision. The study makes the assumption that if the Fed-
eral Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness bar, one would expect 
more findings of nonobvious than obvious and, similarly, significantly 
more affirmances of nonobvious than obvious.92 Put another way, the 
court's behavior would evidence a bias towards lower court and 
USPTO decisions of finding a patent claim nonobvious. 
Then a micro-level study is performed, where, instead of merely 
looking at outcomes for each patent, the reasoning of the decisions 
on nonobviousness over the study's four-year period is explored.93 
Specifically, the importance of the suggestion test to nonobviousness 
determinations is examined. In cases where the Federal Circuit finds 
the claimed invention nonobvious, or reverses or vacates a finding of 
obvious, the decision is read to see if the suggestion test prompted this 
outcome. The study tries to capture how outcome determinative the 
suggestion test is in nonobviousness findings. The suggestion test's 
impact on nonobviousness determinations on summary judgment is 
also investigated. 
Both the macro- and micro-level studies are described and ana-
lyzed in turn, focusing first on appeals from patent infringement cases 
and then on appeals from the USPTO. 
92 The validity of this assumption will be discussed in detail below. See infra notes 
108-11 and accompanying text. 
93 The "micro-level" study basically performs content analysis of the opinions in 
the database, looking at the specific analysis on each patent at issue. Professors 
Petherbridge and Wagner pioneered the use of the technique in patent law. See R 
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assess-
ment of judicial Peiformance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (2004). 
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A. Does the Federal Circuit Employ a Low Nonobviousness Requirement? 
Results From the Macro-Level Study 
This macro-look at the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurispru-
dence attempts to inform the discussion on whether the Federal Cir-
cuit has relaxed the nonobviousness requirement in the following 
manner. First, the affirmance, reversal, and vacation rates over the 
past four years for appeals from findings of nonobvious are compared 
to those from findings of obvious. If the court has lowered the bar, 
one would expect a statistically significant difference between the way 
the Federal Circuit handles nonobvious findings as compared to obvi-
ous findings. The Federal Circuit would favor, and thus affirm more 
often, findings of nonobvious and disfavor, and thus reverse or vacate 
more often, findings of obvious.94 In addition, the lowering of the 
nonobviousness bar would also present itself in the aggregation of the 
holdings by the court in these cases-with findings of non obvious out-
numbering findings of obvious.95 
1. Appeals from Patent Infringement Cases 
In appeals from patent infringement cases, there were 199 pat-
ents that were the subject of a final judgment regarding their validity. 
Of these 199 final validity decisions, sixty-seven were final determina-
tions on the issue of nonobviousness. Added to these sixty-seven final 
determinations were fifteen patents whose finding of nonobvious was 
vacated and twenty patents whose findings of obvious were vacated. 
With these added to the population, there were a total of 102 patents 
that were subjected to some determination on the issue of nonobvi-
ousness over the study's four-year period. Of these 102 patents: 
( 1) 4 7.05% (forty-eight) were the subject of a lower court finding 
of nonobvious while 52.94% (fifty-four) were the subject of a lower 
court finding of obvious;96 
94 Notably, this comparison and statistical test of this comparison was not per-
formed by Professors Petherbridge and Wagner. Their study simply reported the 
aggregate of affirmances, reversals, and vacations because their goal was to determine 
doctrinal stability, not the level of the nonobviousness standard. Petherbridge & Wag-
ner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 31-33). 
95 Again, the various limitations to this assumption-a difference in nonobvious 
and obvious holdings indicates the level of the nonobviousness standard-will be dis-
cussed in detail below. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
96 The almost even spread between lower court decisions finding a patent claim 
nonobvious and those finding a patent claim obvious falls right in line with Professors 
Priest and Klein's model. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes 
for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-17 (1984) (defining what has come to be known 
as the fifty-percent rule). It also comes dose to the observed overall validity rate by 
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(2) 62.5% (thirty) of the nonobvious determinations were 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 6.25% {three) were reversed 
and 31.25% (fifteen) were vacated; and 
(3) 48.15% (twenty-six) of the obvious determinations were 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 12.96% {seven) were reversed 
and 38.89% (twenty-one) were vacated. 
Looking at the descriptive data, there appears to be a slight bias 
favoring lower court nonobvious findings. The affirmance rate is 
higher, and the reversal and vacation rate is lower as compared to 
appeals from obvious findings. However, the question is whether this 
difference is statistically significant. In order to determine whether it 
is, a Fisher's Exact Test is performed on the data.97 
Professors Allison and Lemley. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 205-06 
(observing, from a set of 300 final validity decisions, 162 (54%) patents found valid 
compared to 138 (46%) patents found invalid). 
Of even further interest is comparing the even split observed in these recent 
district court cases to the more lopsided distribution Professors Allison and Lemley 
observed with regards to nonobviousness. While a fifty-fifty split was observed over 
this study's four-year period, from 2002 to 2005, Professors Allison and Lemley 
observed more findings ofnonobvious, with 160 patents (63.7%) being found nonob-
vious and 58 patents (36.3%) being found obvious between 1989 to 1996. ld. at 209. 
This suggests that at the district court level the likelihood of an obvious challenge 
being successful has increased in recent years, at least as compared to the early to 
mid-1990s. 
97 A Fisher's Exact Test is chosen over the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test to measure 
statistical significance because of the small population size and, sometimes, highly 
unbalanced tables, produced by this study. B.S. EVERITT, THE ANALYSIS OF CoNTIN-
GENCY TABLES 7, 15-16 (2d. ed 1992); GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. CocHRAN, 
STATISTICAL METHODS 126-27 (8th ed. 1989) (explaining that the Fisher's Exact Test 
is favored over the Chi-Squared Test for smaller expected frequencies) . 
Fisher's Exact Test requires a 2x2 table, and thus this study will use a 2x2 table, 
with the nonobvious and obvious findings by the lower court defining the two rows 
and the aflirmance and reversal and vacation grouped together defining the two col-
umns. Reversal and vacation were grouped to accommodate the 2x2 table require-
ment. This grouping does not disturb the validity of the results for two reasons. First, 
both indicate that the Federal Circuit negatively viewed the lower court's conclusion. 
While one treatment, reversal, clearly goes to the substance of the determination, 
vacation also indicates at least a slight view towards the substance of the nonobvious-
ness determination. Admittedly, the Federal Circuit could easily be vacating on 
purely procedural grounds-there is still a genuine issue of material fact-when the 
court may still substantively favor the lower court's outcome. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. 
Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But, a vacation is still a 
negative treatment of the decision below and, if the court has lowered the nonobvi-
ousness standard, it would likely vacate more findings of obvious and less findings of 
nonobvious. 
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The results of the Fisher's Exact Test produced a p-value of 
0.1668,98 indicating that the results did not show a significant differ-
ence between the Federal Circuit's handling of a lower court's finding 
of nonobvious as compared to a finding of obvious.99 Such a finding 
suggests that there is no evidence of an inherent bias in the Federal 
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence that favors a finding of non-
obvious or obvious. 100 The nonobviousness requirement cannot be 
significantly low because if it was, presumably the distribution would 
be statistically significant and tilt towards affirmance of findings of 
nonobvious. This result is interesting because it fails to support the 
presently held belief that the court's jurisprudence favors finding 
patent claims nonobvious. 
A similar finding is made when looking at the ultimate holdings 
in nonobviousness cases over the study's four-year period. During this 
time period, the Federal Circuit held thirty-seven patents nonobvious, 
twenty-nine patents obvious, and vacated the lower court's holding for 
thirty-six patents. Figure 1, below, depicts this breakdown graphically. 
98 This is the two-tail p-value. Another test for statistical significance, the Pear-
son's Chi-Squared Test, produced a p-value of 0.2102 for the same 2x2 matrix, con-
firming the results of the Fisher's Exact Test-there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the lower court's finding on nonobviousness and the Federal 
Circuit's affirmance or reversal or vacation of the finding. See generally MICHEAL 0. 
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 157-62 (2d ed. 2001) (describ-
ing the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test). 
This finding was also confirmed when the. negative treatments of the lower 
court's findings was represented individually, defining a 2x3 matrix with the reversals 
and vacations separated. The p-value using the Chi-Squared Test produced a p-value 
of 0.2808, indicating no significant difference. 
99 For the distribution to be statistically significant, a p-value must be less than 
.05. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 484 (3d ed. 1998). A p-value less than .01 
is considered highly statistically significant. Id. 
100 The distribution is, instead, random, possibly mimicking the fifty-percent rule 
that prompted close cases to go to trial and ultimately be appealed to the Federal 
Circuit. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 1. FEDERAL CIRCUIT's HoLDINGS oN NoNOBVIousNEss IN 
APPEALS FROM PATENT INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS 
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The percentage of patents found nonobvious is only slightly 
higher than those found obvious-36.27% compared to 28.43%. 
Ignoring the vacations, there is close to an even split between findings 
of nonobvious and obvious-56.06% compared to 43.93%. This 
frequency fails to support the claim that the nonobviousness require-
ment has lowered significantly. 
What makes this lack of a strong bias particularly remarkable is 
the presumption of validity issued patents enjoy.101 A patent must be 
found invalid not by just a preponderance of the evidence, but by 
clear and convincing evidence.102 Scholars and the FTC Report point 
to this heightened standard as one of the main reasons invalid patents 
are found valid by courts. 103 A finding of nonobvious is therefore 
101 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 
1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
102 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting 
that overcoming the presumption requires a showing of facts provided by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
103 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, at 8-10 (recommending legislation to 
reduce the standard to preponderance of the evidence); Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
lr;norance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497 (2001) (arguing that by 
abolishing the strong presumption of validity, courts could make a more thorough 
validity determination). 
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heavily presumed, making an obvious finding by the Federal Circuit 
inherently less likely regardless of the actual nonobviousness standard 
employed. Because of this presumption, even a neutral nonobvious-
ness standard should produce a greater percentage of patents being 
held nonobvious. The results of this study only mildly mimic the 
presumption, with the split between valid and invalid closer to almost 
fifty-fifty, suggesting that if any bias exists, it is a bias towards finding 
patents obvious, not nonobvious as most critics suggest. 
However, the conclusion that these results, an almost even distri-
bution between nonobvious and obvious findings, mean that the 
nonobviousness standard has not been lowered must be qualified. By 
looking at case outcomes, the study may simply be witnessing close 
cases all centered around a low nonobviousness standard. Thus, the 
study may say nothing about the level of the Federal Circuit's nonobvi-
ousness requirement. 
As Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein observed, liti-
gants will only go to trial if the facts present a close case. 1 04 If the case 
is not close, rational parties will settle. 105 Since only close cases go to 
trial, the predicted success rate for such cases is fifty percent for the 
plaintiff and fifty percent for the defendant.106 This would indicate 
that the cases that form the bases for this study are cases where the 
issue of nonobviousness is close, suggesting that the Federal Circuit's 
findings should break down the middle, with as many findings of non-
obvious as obvious. The study comes close to confirming this 
postulation.107 
When evaluating whether to go to trial or not, litigants will likely 
take into account such things as the current nonobviousness standard 
and the presumption of validity. The only cases that reach the courts 
are those that are, taking into account all of the prevailing legal stan-
dards, coin-flips for the given set of facts. Put another way, the cur-
rent legal standards, including the level of the nonobviousness 
requirement, is subsumed in this decision calculus and thus does not 
necessarily show up in the reported cases studied. If the nonobvious-
ness bar is low, then only those cases where it is a dose call around 
that low bar will be taken to trial and end up at the Federal Circuit. In 
such an environment, the final results of this macro-level study can say 
nothing about where the nonobviousness bar sits. 
104 See Priest & Klein, supra note 96, at 9-17. 
105 Id. at 17. 
106 Id. 
107 The district court results further confirm the fifty-percent rule on the issue of 
nonobviousness. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
936 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 82:3 
But this line of reasoning does not fully discount the significance 
of the macro-level studies results. First, for this line of reasoning to 
hold and a low nonobviousness standard to exist, all of the patents in 
the study must hover around this lower nonobviousness standard and 
are, as a result, invalid under the "correct" standard. Even the strong-
est critics of the Federal Circuit would be unlikely to make this claim. 
All of the patents involved in this study are not "bad" patents. 108 Sec-
ond, this critique rests on the assumption that litigants have a good 
understanding of exactly where the nonobviousness bar sits. That is, 
that their behavior follows Professors Priest and Klein's theory to the 
letter. 109 It has been observed that, in practice, the fifty-percent rule 
does not hold true. 11° Finally, if the Federal Circuit had lowered the 
nonobviousness bar, and these results simply record litigants' under-
standing of this lowering, the Federal Circuit would have to communi-
cate the lowering in some way. Finding more patents nonobvious as 
opposed to obvious would be the likely vehicle through which to send 
this message. As the results indicate, the message the Federal Circuit 
has sent is that it is an even playing field, with patents as likely to be 
found nonobvious as obvious. 
Thus, a truly lowered bar or real bias towards finding patents 
non obvious would likely result in a greater number of findings of non-
obvious than obvious. This is not the case. The court's jurisprudence 
appears to have not significantly pushed the doctrine towards one par-
ticular finding or another. The ultimate conclusion, that the nonobvi-
ousness requirement has not been lowered, cannot be conclusively 
made based on the results of this macro-level study. But, the study, at 
the very least, gives no indication that the opposite is true, as critics 
argue-that the Federal Circuit has lowered the requirement. 
This all being said, it is surprising, given the current discourse, 
that an even distribution between findings of nonobvious and obvious 
was observed. 111 Hopefully, the micro-level study112 will provide a bet-
108 See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 391 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(involving a patent on the transdermal administration of the narcotic drug fentanyl); 
Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 76 F. App'x 298, 300 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(considering a patent on a programmable semiconductor memory chip). 
109 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors 
of Pailure to Settle, 49 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 315, 322-23 (1999) (noting that Priest and 
Klein's model "predicts that the close cases will be tried"). 
110 See David Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Mul-
timodel Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STun. 233, 248-249 
(1996). 
Ill Professors Petherbridge and Wagner make a similar observation, albeit in pass-
ing. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 41-42) (finding a 
higher frequency of obvious findings (57.8%) as compared to nonobvious findings 
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ter insight as to whether the bar has been lowered by focusing on the 
alleged cause of this lowering-the suggestion test. 
2. Appeals from the USPTO 
In appeals from the Board of the USPTO, there were seventy-two 
applications and issued patents that were the subject of a final deter-
mination regarding patentability or validity. Of these seventy-two 
appealed patents and patent applications, fifty involved final determi-
nations on the issue of nonobviousness. Added to these fifty final 
determinations, there were four patent applications whose findings of 
obviousness were vacated and remanded. With these decisions added 
to the population, there were a total of fifty-four patents and patent 
applications that were subjected to some determination on the issue 
of nonobviousness over the four-year period of the study. Of these 
fifty-four patents and patent applications: 
( 1) all, 100% (one), of the nonobvious determinations were 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit; and 
(2) 86.79% (forty-six) of the obvious determinations were 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 5.66% (three) were reversed 
and 7.55% (four) were vacated. 
These data indicate that the Federal Circuit has not lowered the 
nonobviousness bar with respect to the USPTO over the four-year 
period. The high affirmance rate of findings of nonobvious is particu-
larly telling. The descriptive statistics show that the Federal Circuit's 
nonobviousness jurisprudence represents little to no obstacle to 
affirming findings of obvious by the USPTO. When looking at the 
outcome in all of the nonobviousness cases appealed from the 
USPTO, the percentage of patent, or patent applications, found obvi-
ous by the Federal Circuit is extremely high. Figure 2, below, depicts 
the final tally: 
(42.4%)). The difference between this study's findings and Petherbridge and Wag-
ner's may be explained by the period of time over which the samples were collected 
or the inclusion of Rule 36 cases in this study. Regardless of the reason, Professor 
Petherbridge and Wagner's finding of an almost even split validates this study's 
results. 
112 See infra Part III.B.l. 
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FIGURE 2. FEDERAL CIRCUIT's HoLDINGs oN 
NoNOBVIOUSNEss IN APPEALS FROM THE USPTO 
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Of further interest, the high rate of affirmance of obvious find-
ings (86.79%) stands in stark contrast to the similar statistic in the 
patent infringement case setting ( 48.15%). This indicates that the 
Federal Circuit is even more likely to find a claim obvious in an appeal 
from the USPTO than a district court. The statistical significance of 
this difference is testable by performing a Fisher's Exact Test on the 
handling of appeals from findings of obvious by district courts and the 
USPTO. The result is a p-value of .0000266, indicating a highly statis-
tically significant difference. USPTO obvious findings are more likely 
to be affirmed than similar findings by district courts. 
This difference can arguably be explained by the differing stan-
dards of review and the varying presumptions between the two types 
of appeals. First, appeals from the USPTO are reviewed under the 
Administrative Procedure Act's standard of review. 113 The ultimate 
nonobviousness determination is a question of law, and thus reviewed 
de novo by the Federal Circuit.114 But the underlying factual determi-
nations are reviewed for substantial evidence, a more deferential stan-
dard then those applied to summary judgments or JMOLs by district 
113 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164-65 (1999). 
114 See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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courts. 115 This greater deference applied to all USPTO's fact findings 
could explain the higher rate of affirmance of obvious determina-
tions. To add to this, most of the appeals from the USPTO involve 
patent applications, as opposed to already issued patents, that are not 
subject to the same strong presumption of validity as in district 
court.116 Finding a patent application invalid is thus much easier than 
finding an issued patent invalid, making it easier for the Federal 
Circuit to agree with a USPTO' s conclusion of obvious. 
However, the FTC and NRC reports and the briefing in support 
of certiorari in KSR argue that Federal Circuit jurisprudence has 
made it particularly more difficult for the USPTO to find patent appli-
cations obvious.117 If this assertion was true, one would expect a 
higher degree of reversal of USPTO findings by the Federal Circuit. 
Or, at the very least, that this lowering of the nonobviousness bar 
would counteract the standard of review's and lack of a presumption's 
push towards affirming a USPTO finding of obvious. This is clearly 
not the case, with 86.79% of the USPTO's findings of obvious being 
affirmed. The current thinking that the USPTO cannot, under the 
current law, properly find a patent application invalid does not appear 
to be supported. 11B 
But, as with the district court results, these results may provide 
little insight into whether the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonob-
viousness requirement. First, appeals from the USPTO do not tell the 
full story. The alleged disparate impact of the Federal Circuit's juris-
prudence, particularly In re Song-Su Lee, 119 may still be observed at the 
Board level, or the individual examination level. That is, the USPTO's 
hands may truly be tied by the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence and the 
result is the issuance of obvious patents that are never reviewed by the 
Federal Circuit.120 The number of patent applications from the 
115 Compare In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (establishing 
the substantial evidence standard of review for appeals of facts from the USPTO), with 
Hilgraeve Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting 
that summary judgments are reviewed de novo). 
116 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
("The general presumption of patent validity does not pertain to patent applications 
before they issue."). 
117 See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text. 
118 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner come to a similar conclusion, but in a 
different manner, looking at the rate of reversal of USPTO decisions. Petherbridge & 
Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 37-38). 
119 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring the USPTO to provide 
concrete evidence to support its conclusion of obvious). 
120 The Board, or other parts of the USPTO, does not have the power to appeal 
the issuance of a patent. Only an aggrieved inventor whose patent application has 
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USPTO the Federal Circuit sees, and finds invalid, may be dwarfed by 
the number of patent applications "improperly" granted by the 
USPTO because of the Federal Circuit's case law. 
The USPTO may also be operating under the lower standard, and 
thus the cases coming up to the Federal Circuit have already taken the 
standard into account. This masks the ability for the study to tease 
out, from final holdings, the level of the nonobviousness standard. 
The inability of the USPTO to appeal close cases also hampers the 
study's ability to provide any insight into the court's jurisprudence. 
But, in light of this high affirmance rate, patent applicants would 
only go through the cost of appealing in those cases where they think 
they have a good chance of winning. 121 Patent applicants would be 
appealing stronger and stronger cases of nonobvious, testing the 
height, or strength, of the standard. And even under this scenario, 
the affirmance rate stays high, creating a viable inference that the 
Federal Circuit is keeping the nonobviousness standard stiff, at least in 
the context of the USPTO. 
The high affirmance rate would, in turn, have the opposite effect 
on the USPTO. The study shows that the OSPTO sees a high affirm-
ance rate of its findings of obvious. This sends a message to the Board 
and individual examiners that such findings of patent claims as obvi-
ous are supported, and that the support is strong. The USPTO is just 
as likely to push in the other direction, feeling more and more com-
fortable finding the close case obvious. Both of these reactions would 
create a pool of appealed cases from the USPTO that are testing how 
high the nonobviousness standard can get, not how low. 
The very high affirmance rate in response, thus, tells more than 
the results from district court cases. These results bring the assertion 
that the nonobviousness standard has been lowered into greater ques-
tion. It also contradicts the specific assertion made by critics-that 
the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence is particularly harmful to the 
USPTO. These data indicate that the USPTO, at least at the Federal 
Circuit level, does not have a particularly difficult time successfully 
proving a patent claim obvious. In addition, these findings may 
become more telling when combined with the micro-level study that 
tests whether the bar has been lowered by the suggestion test. 
been rejected may appeal the rejection to the Federal Circuit. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 
(Supp. Ill 2003). 
121 The average cost of appealing a patent application to the Board in 2005 was 
$8,495. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE EcoNOMIC SURVEY, at 
I-98 (2005). While this cost may seem small, it may almost double the cost of patent 
prosecution in some cases. See id. at l-95 (noting that the average cost of filing a 
patent application is $11,218). 
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B. Does the Federal Circuit's "Suggestion Test" Lower the Nonobviousness 
Requirement? Results From the Micro-Level Study 
In addition to testing whether there is a general bias towards 
nonobvious findings or a lowering of the bar in the Federal Circuit's 
nonobviousness case law, the study also investigates the impact of the 
court's suggestion test. Two specific claims regarding the suggestion 
test are investigated. First, this "micro-level"I 22 part of the study tests 
whether the suggestion test causes most, if not all, nonobvious find-
ings. Put another way, it examines whether the suggestion test actu-
ally operates as a one-way ratchet in most nonobviousness cases. 
Second, this part of the study examines whether the suggestion test 
hinders the ability for nonobviousness determinations to be made on 
summary judgment. 
In order to gain information on whether the Federal Circuit actu-
ally uses the suggestion test, this micro-level part of the study first 
focuses on cases in which the Federal Circuit either affirmed a finding 
of nonobvious or reversed or vacated a finding of obvious over the 
four-year period. The study focuses on these opinions because they 
are the only cases where the suggestion test could have prompted a 
finding favoring a conclusion of nonobvious. The study will then 
consider the procedural mechanism through which the findings on 
nonobviousness were made by the tribunal below-summary judg-
ment, ]MOL, jut:y trial, or bench trial-and how the Federal Circuit 
handled the lower court's decision. As with the macro-level study, 
appeals from patent infringement cases are considered first, then 
appeals from the USPTO .123 
122 This part of the study is identified as "micro-level" because more data is taken 
than just the outcome for each individual patent. The specific reasoning of the deci-
sion causing that particular outcome is examined and recorded. This low-level look at 
a court's decisions-one termed "micro-level" but also known as content analysis-
has been done before in the patent context and in other areas of law. See, e.g., Pether-
bridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. 
Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of judicial Opinions, (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Stud-
ies Paper No. 913336, 2006), available at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=913336 (advocat-
ing the use of a content-based method of evaluating caselaw). 
123 However, for this part of the study, appeals from the USPTO will be ignored 
when looking into the suggestion test's impact on summary judgment because there is 
no directly equivalent mechanism in the USPTO. All USPTO decisions that get to the 
Federal Circuit have gone through full adjudication. 
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1. The Suggestion Test as the Cause of Nonobvious Findings 
a. Appeals in Patent Infringement Cases 
In the study's population of patent infringement cases, there 
were thirty patents for which the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of 
nonobvious, seven patents where a finding of obvious was reversed, 
and twenty-one patents where a finding of obvious was vacated. In 
total, there were fifty-eight patents for which the Federal Circuit either 
ultimately found the patent claims nonobvious or vacated a finding of 
obvious. This universe of opinions includes the only instances in 
which the suggestion test could have prompted a conclusion of non-
obvious or denied a conclusion of obvious. 12 4 
The opinions concerning these patents were examined to deter-
mine the reasoning employed by the Federal Circuit to support its 
final holding.125 The reasoning was coded based on the part of the 
nonobviousness analysis upon which the court relied to come to its 
conclusion. The codes included: 
(1) failure to meet the suggestion· test; 
(2) secondary considerations rebutted a prima facie case of 
obvious; 
(3) elements of the claimed invention were not in the prior art; 
( 4) claim interpretation was incorrect; 
(5) other reason; 126 or 
(6) unknown. 127 
After looking at these data, another code was created for 
instances where both the litigants failed to meet the suggestion test 
124 There are twenty-nine other patents where the suggestion test clearly did not 
cause a finding of nonobvious. These include twenty-six affirmances of a finding of 
obvious and three reversals of a finding of nonobvious. These twenty-nine patents are 
instances where the suggestion test did not act as a one-way ratchet and force a find-
ing of nonobvious. More will be discussed about these additional findings below. See 
infra text accompanying notes 131-32. 
125 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner, while looking at the result of the use of 
the suggestion test, do not investigate its specific usage in findings favoring nonobvi-
ousness. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 43-49). Obtaining 
and analyzing this additional data gives a fuller and more useful picture of the Federal 
Circuit current nonobviousness doctrine. 
126 In most instances, the "other reasons" were procedural. See, e.g., Catalina 
Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming a 
holding of non obvious because the defendant failed to preserve the right to appeal 
the nonobviousness issue). 
127 The unknowns included all of the Rule 36 opinions where a finding of nonob-
vious was affirmed, but the conclusory nature of the ruling shed no light as to why the 
court affirmed the holding. 
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and secondary considerations rebutted a prima facie case.128 The 
results of this coding are represented graphically below in Figure 3.129 
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The descriptive statistics can be further categorized to gain a bet-
ter handle on the extent to which the suggestion test causes a finding, 
or possible finding, of nonobvious. All of those findings based, at 
least in part, on a failure to meet the suggestion test are combined, 130 
and all other findings, other than those whose reasoning is unknown, 
are combined. The results of this combination are depicted below, in 
Figure 4. 
128 This is, most likely, an example of "piling on" by the court. See, e.g., PIN/NIP, 
Inc. v. Patte Chern. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1245-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
129 The results in Figure 3 are normalized to the complete universe of patent 
appeals from district courts where nonobviousness was at issue. Thus, the results are 
depicted as percentages of this complete population-102 patents. 
130 There were instances, as shown in Figure 3, where the Federal Circuit found 
the suggestion test not met and found the presence of secondary considerations that 
the patent claim was nonobvious. 
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FIGURE 4. REAsoN FOR AFFIRMING A FINDING oF NoNOBvrous OR 
REVERSING/VACATING A FINDING OF OBVIOUS 
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Disregarding the findings whose reasoning is unknown, there 
exists an even split between those cases where the suggestion test 
prompts a nonobvious-oriented finding and those cases where some-
thing else prompts such a finding. The suggestion test, it would there-
fore seem, plays a major role in the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness 
jurisprudence. 
The suggestion test does not, however, play as great of a role as 
critics suggest. In almost as many situations a patent is found nonobvi-
ous because an element of the claimed invention is not found in the 
prior art, a part of the nonobviousness inquiry expressly established in 
Graham. 131 The suggestion test is a one-way ratchet by definition-it 
must be met to find a claim obvious. But it does not act as one in at 
least 43.1% of those cases where the court found the claim nonobvi-
ous or vacated a finding of obvious. The results show that the sugges-
tion test is a big factor in nonobvious findings, but it is not an 
overwhelming factor. 
To put the suggestion test's impact in complete perspective, 
those cases where a lack of suggestion is found can be compared to 
both cases where there is another basis to support a finding of nonob-
vious and those cases where the court actually finds the claim obvious. 
131 Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
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This additional category, cases where the Federal Circuit finds the 
claim obvious, is another instance where the suggestion test did not 
force a finding of nonobvious. With these additional findings, twenty-
six affirmances of obvious findings and three reversals of nonobvious 
findings, the role of the suggestion test in modern Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence becomes smaller. 
The suggestion test, therefore, prompted a finding of nonobvi-
ous, or vacation of a finding of obvious, for twenty-five patents 
compared to fifty-four patents where the suggestion test clearly played 
no role. Over the past four years, for every one patent where the sug-
gestion test dictated the decision, two patents were not influenced by 
the test. The suggestion test does not influence the final nonobvious-
ness decision in nearly the number of cases suggested by recent 
criticism. 
This finding becomes even more interesting when combined with 
the almost even frequency of ultimate findings of nonobvious and 
obvious discussed in Part III.A.l There, the results were discounted 
because litigants could have been operating under the lowered non-
obviousness bar, bringing cases that assumed a lower standard would 
be applied. Critics assert that this lower standard is created by the 
suggestion test, but the results of the micro-level study indicate that 
the suggestion test does not play as large of a role. Litigants, reading 
the Federal Circuit case law over this four year period, would not 
come away with the impression that the suggestion test drives the deci-
sion in most nonobviousness cases. If the suggestion test is the alleged 
cause of the lowered nonobviousness requirement, the Federal Cir-
cuit's case law is not adequately sending that message to patent play-
ers. These results, therefore, call into question the discounting of the 
results in Part III.A.l It possibly revives the initial inference from the 
almost even split in nonobvious to obvious outcomes-that the non-
obviousness requirement has not been lowered. 
One final observation of interest needs to be made. This part of 
the study also uncovered the miniscule role secondary considerations 
play in the Federal Circuit nonobviousness jurisprudence. In only 
one instance were secondary considerations by themselves the reason 
for a holding, and it was only to vacate a lower court's holding of 
obvious.132 In the four other patents where secondary considerations 
were used to support the court's decision, the court also relied upon a 
132 See Display Techs., Inc. v. Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 282 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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failure to meet the suggestion test to support its conclusion.133 These 
results confirm those of Professor Mandel, who also concluded that 
secondary considerations play a very insignificant role in nonobvious-
ness jurisprudence.I34 This finding is of interest because it brings into 
question some of the criticism of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence 
centered on secondary considerations. 135 
b. Appeals from the USPTO 
The study turned up fewer relevant data points to perform the 
same inquiry as done above-looking at the suggestion test's effect on 
affirmances of nonobvious findings and reversals and vacations of 
obvious findings by the USPTO. There were only eight such patents 
that fell into these categories and in five of them failing the suggestion 
test was the reason for the court's conclusion. Three of the patents 
were found nonobvious or remanded on other grounds. 
The lack of data is not surprising given that mainly findings of 
obvious are appealed from the USPTO and the affirmance rate of 
such findings by the Federal Circuit is very high. 136 The high affirm-
ance of obvious findings by the USPTO indicates that the suggestion 
test represents even less of an obstacle in USPTO cases. The Federal 
Circuit allowed the suggestion test to be met and patents held obvious 
for forty-six patents on appeal from the USPTO. Thus, in total, the 
suggestion test did not force a finding of nonobvious in forty-nine 
(90.74%) of the fifty-four patents appealed from the USPTO. 
However, the whole story does not show up in the population 
studied. As previously mentioned, there are very limited instances in 
which the court will see appeals from the issuance of patents.137 A 
high number of situations could, and most likely do, exist where the 
suggestion test prompted a finding of nonobvious and resulted in the 
allowance of a patent application. This study, because of the parame-
ters chosen, does not have the ability to take into account the com-
plete usage of the suggestion test at the USPTO level. 
133 See Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1384-85 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 
1186, 1196-1197 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chern. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 
1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal Mfg. & Sales Corp., 41 F. App'x. 435, 
439-40 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
134 See Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1422-25. 
135 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, at ch. 4, at 15-19 (asserting that the 
Federal Circuit's implementation of the secondary consideration of "commercial 
success" improperly lowers the nonobviousness requirement). 
136 See supra Part III.A.2. 
137 See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. III 2003). 
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This being said, the Federal Circuit's attitude toward, and usage 
of, the suggestion test sets the tone for the USPTO's usage of the test. 
Like district courts, the USPTO is guided by Federal Circuit case law. 
The Federal Circuit, through its high affirmance rate and agreement 
in most cases that the suggestion test is met, signals to the USPTO that 
patent applications can be found obvious and that those findings will 
be supported. The suggestion test definitely plays a role in the 
USPTO's nonobviousness analysis. But, based on the results of this 
study, it does not automatically result in a conclusion of nonobvious in 
most cases. These findings, when combined with those in Part III.A.2 
of the study, indicate that the nonobviousness requirement has not 
been lowered with respect to the USPTO and that the suggestion test 
may not restrict the USPTO as much as critics indicate. 
2. The Suggestion Test as a Barrier to Summary Judgment 
The Federal Circuit's suggestion test is also criticized as being an 
obstacle to summary judgment on nonobviousness. Attempts to 
resolve issues of nonobviousness on summary judgment are thwarted 
by the need to determine whether a suggestion is present or not. 138 
The argument is that since the suggestion test is a factual inquiry,139 it 
will always present a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial to 
resolve. This micro-level part of the study is continued to test this 
assertion. 
Since this inquiry focuses on summary judgment, only appeals 
from patent infringement cases are examined.140 All 102 patents 
where the issue of nonobviousness was on appeal are included, with 
initial attention to how the nonobviousness issue was disposed of by 
the trial court and how the Federal Circuit handled this disposition on 
appeal. There were four types of dispositions observed in the popula-
tion. Two were decisions as a matter of law-summary judgments and 
JMOLs-and two were factual findings-bench trial verdicts and jury 
verdicts. 141 The descriptive statistics are as follows: 
138 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
139 See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "'Determining 
whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior an reference is one 
aspect of determining the scope and content of the prior art, a fact question subsidi-
ary to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness.'» !d. (quoting SIBIA Neurosciences, 
Inc. v. Gadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
140 There is no equivalent to summary judgment in patent examination by the 
USPTO. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SuNG & jEFF E. ScHWARTZ, PATENT LAw HANDBOOK 
§ 11:1 (2005-2006 ed.). 
141 Both of these latter categories-bench trials and jury verdicts-included deni-
als by the district court of requests for judgment~ as a matter of law. 
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(l) the Federal Circuit affirmed 39.02% (sixteen) of the 
appealed summary judgments, while it reversed 0% (zero) of them 
and vacated 60.98% (twenty-five) of them; 
(2) the Federal Circuit affirmed 0% (zero) of the appealed 
JMOLs, while it reversed 55.56% (five) of them and vacated 44.44% 
(four) of them; 
(3) the Federal Circuit affirmed 70.83% (seventeen) of the 
appealed bench trial verdicts, while it reversed 12.5% (three) of them 
and vacated 16.67% (four) of them; and 
(4) the Federal Circuit affirmed 82.14% (twenty-three) of the 
appealed jury verdicts, while it reversed 7.14% (two) of them and 
vacated 10.71% (three) of them. 
Looking at the descriptive statistics alone, a clear difference in 
the court's handling of judgments becomes noticeable. Determina-
tions made outside the full fact finding setting-either by summary 
judgment or as aJMOL-are heavily vacated or reversed. In contrast, 
the affirmance rate for judgments that result from full fact finding-
either by trial before a jury or before a judge-is very high. 
Statistical testing supports this casual observation. A Fisher Exact 
Test results in a p-value of 0.0000086, indicating the differences are 
highly statistically significant. 142 This relationship holds true when 
analyzing the court's disposition of only cases where the lower court 
found the patent claim nonobvious and only cases where the lower 
court found the patent claim obvious. 
The data for only those appeals from decisions finding the patent 
nonobvious are reproduced below: 
142 To increase the validity of the test, statistics were combined in a logical fashion 
to create a 2x2 table. The two judgments as a matter of law-summary judgment and 
]MOL-were combined as were the two factfinding based judgments-bench trial 
and jury trial verdicts. Furthermore, affinnances were viewed as positive treatments of 
the lower court's judgment and reversals and vacations were grouped together and 
considered negative treatments of the lower court's judgment. 
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Just focusing on appeals from findings of nonobvious, there is 
still a significant statistical relationship between outcome and the type 
of lower court judgment. A Fisher's Exact Test produces a p-value of 
0.01434. The Federal Circuit is more likely to affirm a factual finding 
of the lower court as opposed to a legal one, even when the finding at 
issue is one of nonobvious. 
A similar result is found when looking at only lower court judg-
ments of obvious. The data from the study are reproduced below: 
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A Fisher's Exact Test produces a p-value of 0.00083, indicating a 
highly statistically significant relationship between the type of judg-
ment and the Federal Circuit's affirmance or reversal or vacation of a 
finding of obvious. 
Another observation of import can be made from these data. 
The Federal Circuit decisions evidence the same bias in favor of 
bench trial and jury trial verdicts for both findings of non obvious and 
obvious. Such a result is not surprising given the differing standard of 
review applied to these types of judgments. A grant of summary judg-
ment is reviewed de novo, 143 and a grant of JMOL is reviewed under 
the same standard the district court applied-whether no substantial 
evidence supported the jury's verdict.144 Both of these standards give 
the Federal Circuit great leeway in reversing or vacating the lower 
court's judgment. Factual findings made as the result of a bench trial 
are reviewed for clear error145 and those made as a result of jury ver-
dict are reviewed for substantial evidence. 146 These standards are 
more deferential to the lower court's finding and thus restrict the 
scope of the Federal Circuit's review. 
143 See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
144 See SIBIA Neurosciences, 225 F.3d at 1354. 
145 See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
146 SeeTI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 
1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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This result further supports an earlier conclusion in Part Ill.A.l, 
that the Federal Circuit is not biased towards a finding of nonobvious 
or obvious. If a bias, or a lowering of the nonobviousness require-
ment, did exist, then this bias would result in affirmances of such find-
ings regardless of how, procedurally, the lower courts made them. A 
bias towards one or the other would have disturbed the general rela-
tionship between type of judgment and affirmance or reversal or vaca-
tion. It did not. 
But these results beg the question as to the suggestion test's 
impact on these findings. Is the reason for such a high vacation of 
summary judgment determinations the existence of the suggestion 
test? A closer look at the cases where a summary judgment was on 
appeal is taken. 
Sixteen of the forty-one summary judgments on appeal were 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, eight of which were affirmances of 
summary judgments of nonobvious and the other eight affirmances of 
summary judgments of obvious. For these sixteen, the suggestion test 
was clearly not an obstacle to summary judgment considering the sum-
mary judgments in those cases were both granted by the lower court 
and allowed to stand. The question becomes how the suggestion test 
operated in the other twenty-five cases where the Federal Circuit 
vacated the summary judgment below. 
Codings similar to those used in Part Ill.B.l are used, looking to 
see if the vacation was due to a factual issue regarding the suggestion 
test or some other grounds. The results are as follows: 
(1) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments 
were vacated because of factual issues related to the suggestion test; 
(2) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments 
were vacated because of factual issues related to the contents of the 
prior art; 
(3) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments 
were vacated because of erroneous claim constructions; and 
(4) 16.0% (four) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments 
were vacated because of some other reason.I 47 
The suggestion test denied summary judgment on the issue of 
nonobviousness in a little over a quarter of the Federal Circuit's vaca-
tions during the study's four-year period. Lack of a claim element in 
the prior art, or an erroneous claim interpretation, played an equal 
147 These other reasons, in most instances, were basic legal errors. See, e.g., 
TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that nothing in the prosecution history could overcome the statutory 
mandate to assess a patent claim's nonobviousness in litigation). 
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role in vacating nonobviousness determinations as the suggestion test. 
The suggestion test was a factor, but no more so than other reasons 
the court used to vacate summary judgments. 
When looked at in the context of the complete universe of forty-
one summary judgments that were appealed, the suggestion test is 
seen as playing a very small role in preventing summary judgment. 
The suggestion test was a barrier to summary judgment in only 
17.07% of all patents subject to summary judgment in the study. 
These findings do not support the assertion that the suggestion test is 
a major obstacle to summary judgment on the issue of nonobvious-
ness. It plays no more, and perhaps less, of a role than other parts of 
the nonobviousness analysis or other parts of the patent litigation 
process. 
This micro-level study does not, however, include all summary 
judgments on the issue of nonobviousness over the four-year period. 
Summary judgments may have been denied at the district court level 
due to the suggestion test and simply not appealed. The factual 
nature of the suggestion test may also stand as an obstacle to clearer 
evaluations of threats of litigation or offers to license. 
But, again, the study indicates that the Federal Circuit did not 
systematically use the suggestion test as a barrier to summary judg-
ment over the four-year period. True, in some instances, such as KSR, 
the suggestion test was used to vacate a summary judgment on nonob-
viousness. But this was one of only seven instances. These data 
points, by themselves, do not define an overwhelming trend. And 
they certainly do not signal one to patent players. The real barrier to 
summary judgment in nonobviousness cases may be the nature of 
summary judgment itself and, perhaps, the Federal Circuit's general 
view toward the procedural device. 
CoNCLUSION 
The study provides much needed insight into the Federal Cir-
cuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. In turn, it informs the discourse 
on nonobviousness reform and the pending KSR case. Both the 
macro-level and micro-level studies provide some interesting findings. 
Some of those findings from the macro-level study are as follows: 
(1) The almost even distribution between findings ofnonobvious 
(36.27%) and obvious (28.43%) in appeals from patent infringement 
cases; and 
(2) The high percentage of findings of obvious (85.19%) in 
appeals from the USPTO. 
2007] NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 953 
Neither of these results directly addresses whether the Federal 
Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement. As discussed, 
however, they do create at least a weak inference that the standard has 
not been relaxed, particularly in the USPTO setting. If the bar had 
been lowered, one would expect a higher number of nonobvious find-
ings. Furthermore, of relevance to recent claims, these findings 
clearly do not give support to recent assertions-that the bar has been 
lowered. 
Some of the more interesting findings from the micro-level study 
are: 
(1) the small role the suggestion test plays in nonobviousness 
determinations, leading to a finding of nonobvious, or denying a find-
ing of obvious, in 24.5% of the patents appealed from patent infringe-
ment cases and 9.26% of patent appealed from the USPTO; and 
(2) the small role the suggestion test plays in vacations of sum-
mary judgment on nonobviousness, leading to a denial in 17.07% of 
the patents appealed. 
These findings have a direct bearing on the reason most believe 
the nonobviousness standard has decreased-the suggestion test. The 
study's results indicate that the suggestion test only forces a finding of 
nonobvious in one-third of patent infringement appeals and one-
tenth of appeals from the USPTO. If the bar has decreased, another 
factor is to blame. In addition, while the Federal Circuit does vacate a 
good number of summary judgments on nonobviousness (60.98%), 
the suggestion test can only account for less than one-third of those 
vacations. Assertions that the existence of the suggestion test forces a 
trial on nonobviousness are not supported. 
All of these findings should, at the very least, give pause to recent 
calls to modifY or do away with the suggestion test and the Federal 
Circuit's recent nonobviousness jurisprudence. This is particularly 
true when they are combined with the recent findings of Professors 
Petherbridge and Wagner and Professor Mandel.148 It does not 
appear that the court is tilted one way or the other. Nor does the 
suggestion test seem to be playing as large of a role in the jurispru-
dence as thought. This is not to say that the suggestion test and the 
Federal Circuit should be ignored. Instead, the study suggests that 
those wishing to reform nonobviousness should expand those parts of, 
and players in, the patent process subject to investigation and possible 
change. 
148 Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at ll-20; Petherbridge & Wagner, 
supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20). 
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